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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the interplay of markets, ethics and law, and rising demand for 
ethical behavior in a market driven society coping with the promise and peril of 
rapid technological innovation.  We analyze the market affecting role of our 
Common Law/Rule of Law System, its adaptability to social need and resultant 
legal and regulatory action promoting adherence to the spirit as well as the letter 
of the law.  We provide examples of manager and firm harm from sanctions 
imposed despite adherence to “the rules.”  Finally, we discuss competitive 
market/common law interplay in the coming era of the genome. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
…a major asset of our nation (is) the integrity of our financial system. 
Trust is a principle of central importance to all effective financial systems.  
Our system is strong and vibrant in large part because we demand that 
financial institutions participating in our markets operate with 
integrity…When confidence in the integrity of a financial institution is 
shaken, or its commitment to the honest conduct of business is in doubt, 
public trust erodes and the entire system is weakened.   
 
– Alan Greenspan 
Testimony before a U.S. Senate Committee, November 27, 1995 
 
In the United States today, both the law and the regulators are demanding an increasing 
attention to ethical behavior on the part of firms participating in our domestic capitalist system.  
This is, in substantial measure, due to our society’s need for, and rising expectation of, such 
behavior in the face of the rising power of competitive markets in the life of the body politic. 
In Part I of this paper, we propose to explain why and how our Common Law/Rule of 
Law system allows for effective legal and regulatory responses to social demand and, in essence, 
promotes adherence to the spirit of the law in addition to the letter of the law.  In the process, we 
will give examples of specific legal and regulatory responses in our time to unethical market 
behavior illustrating both the insufficiency, and clear inefficiency, of mere compliance with 
existing rules.  In Part II of this paper we intend to confront the extraordinary demands being 
made upon the law and the regulators, in our Rule of Law system, to honor society’s needs and 
expectations relative to trust, integrity and overall fairness in competitive markets in the face of 
rapid, and often bewildering technological development.  We will focus at this point on the 
unique adaptability of the common law process, in order to suggest how our legal and financial 
systems might best adapt to this new century in cyberspace.  In our Conclusion, we will note 
briefly the applicability of our analysis of the markets-ethics-law process in securities markets, to 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Page 3 
another technology driven, market-related development in our time---a challenge to the law and 
to regulators so severe as to involve the possibility of substantive change in the fundamental 
nature of our society. 
 
I. The Common Law/Rule of Law System and Its Response to Some Questionable Securities 
Markets Behavior 
The United States legal system has its roots in the Constitution of the United States.  As 
the protector of constitutional values, the legal system is both values-based and adaptable to 
change in the interpretation of those values.  Adaptability is key to maintaining the integrity of 
the original constitutional contract. 
Our constitutional values, due process and separation of church and state, for example, 
are permanent at base, but they are not immutable.  Such values set forth in the Constitution, as 
reinterpreted, but never rejected by the citizenry in succeeding generations1, are the foundation 
upon which our society is built, and by means of which it functions as it does.  And property 
rights, the freedom to contract, and access to an independent judiciary are examples of the 
fulfillment of these values.  Upholding these values is an obligation, and our financial 
institutions, no less the citizenry in general, are bound to meet that obligation or risk turning the 
Constitution into mere pieces of paper2.   However, the practical, workable shape these values 
assume, and how they are both protected and enforced, is determined by a free, democratic 
citizenry in succeeding generations under changing conditions. 
The Rule of Law in a Constitutional Democracy must function as the Constitution does:  
its practical, workable shape must be subject to change under changing conditions.  The end of 
the Rule of Law is always to strengthen and uphold the values inherent in the original contract—
by assuring that we and our institutions, including the financial, fulfill our obligations to uphold 
those values as well. 
Our Rule of Law functions through a process remarkably well suited to the task.  That 
process is “The Common Law.”  The common law system originated in England and was 
adopted in the United States.  The majority of western nations utilize a different legal process, 
based upon a comprehensive set of written statutes referred to collectively as a Civil Law Code.  
The answers to legal questions must proceed from what is within the Code, not from outside it.  
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The individual statutes can be changed.  But until they are, they govern all cases.  The following 
quote illustrates how the common law system differs from a Civil Law Code system: 
Our common law is different.  It is generally derived from principles rather than rules; it does not 
consist of absolute, fixed and inflexible rules, but rather of broad and comprehensible principles 
based on justice, reason and common sense.  Its principles have been determined by the social 
needs of the community and have changed with changes in such needs.  These principles are 
susceptible to new conditions, interests, relations and usages as the progress of society may 
require.3 
Judges make the common law.  But they must observe two very important requirements 
while doing so.  First, they must honor stare decisis which means literally that they must honor 
the laws that have already been laid down in very similar cases.  But stare decisis is not 
inviolable.  What judges who wish to depart from precedent must do is elucidate very carefully 
good cause to repudiate it.  And they are subject to reversal by a higher (appellate) court.  
Second, judges must reduce all their opinions to writing, so that they are on the record as to 
reasoning and result.  At the trial level there is a full transcript.  All appellate opinions are printed 
and available for reading in law libraries and, more recently, on the Internet.  These two 
requirements assure a satisfactory measure of stability in the law so that people and organizations 
might have guidance on how to act in legally-related situations. 
There are plenty of statutes passed in the United States at the Federal and State level, as 
well as allied regulations.  Nevertheless, our basic body of law is common law based, and the 
principle of incorporating change when necessary permeates our legal process.  The common 
law, in actuality, is neither loose nor unduly broad for reasons we will soon detail.  However, it is 
certainly more changeable than is civil law.  Free, competitive market managers in the United 
States neglect that reality at their peril, as we hope to demonstrate. 
Only Congress can create federal law, and  state legislatures state law; however, since no 
legislative body could possibly deal with every request for bank mergers, or drug releases, or 
spectrum licenses, nor maintain oversight over all industries, they pass legislation appointing 
administrative agencies to do so, called enabling legislation.  This legislation, to put it succinctly, 
sets out priorities and ground rules.  The administrative agency then fleshes them out.4  In the 
face of the large delegations of power to administrative agencies, where lies the common law 
concern about carefully, but necessarily, taking into account in decision-making the social needs 
conceptions and concerns of the body politic?  That concern, too, lies within the purview of the 
Page 5 
administrative agency—within the bounds of their congressional mandate.  Thus agencies, such 
as the SEC, deal not only with what brokerage houses and investment banks do in fact (their 
actual conduct), but with what they ought to do (their ethical conduct) as well. 
In sum, we emphasize that in our United States constitutional society, we are involved in 
a constant attempt to preserve those values that cannot be allowed ever to change.  We do so by 
re-interpreting and reshaping them through our Common Law/Rule of Law process to make them 
meaningful in a current social context.  The values are the ends, the process the means to achieve 
those ends.   
We proceed now to some securities market activities that illustrate the key corollary here:  
underlying business values such as fairness, integrity, transparency and trustworthiness should 
not be allowed to change either, although the shape they assume in the current social, 
technological context certainly may change.  The nature of the changes, one might argue, can 
best be determined by markets and market players.  A serious problem there, however, lies in a 
general market player belief that rules are rules, and playing strictly by them is all the market 
player is required to do.  Consider the following quotation: 
As an anonymous participant in financial markets, I never had to weigh the social 
consequences of my actions…I felt justified in ignoring them on the grounds that I was 
playing by the rules…(this) makes it all the more important that the rules that govern markets 
should be properly formulated.  The anonymous participant can ignore moral, political and 
social considerations, but if we look at financial markets from the standpoint of society, we 
cannot leave such considerations out.  Although we are justified in playing by the rules, we 
ought to be concerned with the rules by which we play.5 
The preceding quotation from one of the most influential players in the world financial 
markets raises two issues.  Is it true that all participants in U.S. securities markets are “justified” 
in playing by the rules even with the knowledge that they are thereby causing social harm?  And 
if participants do believe and act upon that “justification”, how then are they to manifest their 
“concern” about “ignoring moral, political and social considerations” and the social harm they 
have caused?  Ought they to lobby legislators to force them to be ethical? 
George Soros, the source of the quotation, has actually shown his concern very clearly by 
being a very active personal participant in, and major financial contributor to, many positive 
socio-political endeavors.  Our purpose here is not to fault him, but to challenge his dichotomy:  
that it is “right” to simply play by the rules regardless of any and all political, social, and ethical 
consequences to anyone, anywhere; however, at the same time,  players must be concerned, 
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outside the game, with the nature of such rules as produce morally, politically and socially 
unacceptable results. 
This ethical compartmentalization is not acceptable generally in its determination that 
behavior demonstrably dangerous to the welfare of others is demanded by business necessity, and 
protected by rules which were made (or neglected to be made) by representatives of those 
actually harmed.  As a matter of principle, shifting the blame for destructive behavior onto the 
alleged proxies of those destroyed, is unacceptable outside of markets.  For example, terrorist 
actions against innocent civilians, which the terrorists justify by reference to the active policies of 
the civilians’ own governments, are in turn destructive of the aspirations of the terrorists’ 
peoples.  Certainly the dichotomy is unacceptable in a democratic republic where basic values 
representing the citizenry’s choices about how it wishes to live and be governed, are required to 
be enforced by a socially adaptable Common Law/Rule of Law.  One’s duty to those values is not 
waived while one is engaged in the market game, precisely because how that game is played 
deeply affects the content of those values.   
We also oppose another part of  Soros’ statement, which says that in the fiercely 
competitive struggle for profits “playing by the rules” is all that can be asked of any participant,  
or that ethical behavior beyond the rules will cause the actor to be smashed by others who steer 
clear of ethical action.  Our contrary assertion is twofold.  First, given the nature and makeup of 
our common law, any securities market manager who does steer clear of ethical action is not only 
headed for serious personal trouble, but may well be taking his firm, his stockholders, and even 
the reputation of his industry down with him.  Second, we are convinced that ethical and socio-
political insights and skills should be required of every manager with authority to act for his firm 
in securities markets operations.  Such insights and skills are intimately related to the value of the 
firm, as the following examples help to show. 
 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Until very recently, the idea of holding corporations themselves criminally liable for illegal 
actions of their employees was subject to much criticism.6  The actual record regarding corporate 
conviction for crime shows that prior to the late 1980s and the early 1990s, very few cases were 
even brought to court.  Those that were, were targeted at small companies, not larger, publicly 
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held companies with actively traded stock.7  The situation changed drastically in 1991, the year in 
which a major tool for punishing corporations – “Chapter 8” – became the law of the land.  
In 1984, Congress passed The Sentencing Reform Act.8  That law set up a Federal Sentencing 
Commission charged with developing guidelines to deal with three basic problems: disparity in 
sentencing for federal crimes, uncertainty in sentencing, and an unjust lack of focus on white 
collar crime.  Some judges, academics and lawyers were critical of the sentencing law for various 
reasons, but it was declared constitutional in 1989.9  
Initially, the sentencing guidelines did not deal with organizations.  But they went beyond 
natural persons, focusing on organizational white collar crime, in 1989 amendments which were 
sent to Congress in 1991.  A new chapter was then added to The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  
“Chapter 8:  The Sentencing of Organizations.”  That chapter, with all of its provisions, became 
effective on November 1, 1991.10 Now organizations themselves could be held responsible for 
violations of any federal law.  There are some 3,000 or so federal laws available for breaking, 
involving securities, commercial banking, anti-trust, defrauding the government, and many more. 
The operational market areas covered by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are broad.  Forty-six 
separate categories of offenses are listed under broad headings; for example, “commercial bribery 
and kickbacks” is one of six general offenses listed under “Offenses Involving Property.”  Each 
offense arises out of a particular area of market operations covered by federal law, as stated 
above.11  
Chapter 8 is evidence of official government recognition of an important ethical reality:  that 
much of the illegal action of an organization’s employees arises out of the corporate culture 
within which they function.  This is the organizational link to white collar crime.  A definition of 
“corporate culture is to be found in this organizational statement: 
Our corporate culture…is the sum total of what we believe and think, how we work together 
as colleagues and how we conduct ourselves as individuals.  It is the way we treat our clients, 
our shareholders, our neighbors and the public in general. 
It is who we are.  And while our corporate culture is by nature indefinable, it begins and ends 
with certain principles that underlie our success as a business and as individuals.  Our future 
growth and prosperity depend on our continued commitment to these principles and our ability 
to instill them in others.12 
The current government focus on who and what we are – our behavior and the content of our 
corporate character – is but one example of corporate responsibility going beyond “the rules.”  
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, according to Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder “enables 
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the government to address and be a force for positive change of corporate culture, (to) alter 
corporate behavior, and (to) prevent, discover and punish white collar crime.”13 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have two distinguishing characteristics.  First, they 
provide very specific penalties for specified violations.  Judges must apply these penalties and no 
others, unless their reasons for deviation are fully explained and justified, in writing; for 
example, deviation may be allowed on prosecutor recommendations because of the unusual 
extent of cooperation and assistance by the defendant.  There are very few justifications for 
departing from the Guidelines.  Second, the penalty system for organizations is based upon a 
government commitment to a process best referred to as the carrot and the stick.  Penalties are 
adjusted upward or downward within the mandated categories depending upon  the steps the 
organization has taken, prior to the legal infraction, to avoid criminal conduct, and the 
cooperation with the government the organization has evidenced once an infraction has taken 
place.  Some attention is also given to the involvement or non-involvement of high level 
organization personnel in the infraction. 
Figure 1 lists offense levels on the left.  They are based on the government’s harm priorities.  
Minor offenses are ranked at 6 or less; more serious ones, such as certain anti-trust offenses, can 
be ranked as high as 38 and above.  The dollar fines are shown in the right hand column: as little 
as $5,000 for a minor one, $72,500,000 for a very serious one. 
Because of the carrot and stick approach embedded in the Guidelines, a level 38 infraction 
would not be likely to result in exactly $72,500,000.  That figure would probably be adjusted up 
or down.  The direction of the adjustment would be determined by several factors, particularly 
those set out in the second characteristic discussed above.  Past infractions of federal law are also 
taken into consideration.  All those elements are, together, the basis for what is referred to as the 
organizational “culpability score.”  The culpability score ranges from a low fraction up to 4.  If a 
particular corporate crime is at level 38 or above, and the culpability score is at 4, the total fine 
for that one infraction then would be $290,000,000, an amount calculated to send a clear and 
convincing message. Conversely, there are actions the corporation might have taken that would 
mitigate the  
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Figure 1  CORPORATE FINES 
 
Offense Level Amount
6 or less $5,000 
7 $7,500 
8 $10,000 
9 $15,000 
10 $20,000 
11 $30,000 
12 $40,000 
13 $60,000 
14 $85,000 
15 $125,000 
16 $175,000 
17 $250,000 
18 $350,000 
19 $500,000 
20 $650,000 
21 $910,000 
22 $1,200,000 
23 $1,600,000 
24 $2,100,000 
25 $2,800,000 
26 $3,700,000 
27 $4,800,000 
28 $6,300,000 
29 $8,100,000 
30 $10,500,000 
31 $13,500,000 
32 $17,500,000 
33 $22,000,000 
34 $28,500,000 
35 $36,000,000 
36 $45,500,000 
37 $57,500,000 
38 or more $72,500,000 
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offense level, say down to 28.  Given an insignificant “culpability score,” the total penalty could 
be, say, $10,000,000 rather than $290,000,000, a rather significant savings. 
One major before-the-fact mitigator is the existence within the organization of “an effective 
program to prevent and detect violations of the law.”  There are 10 elements that make up such a 
program, and they are contained in the Guidelines manual—a publication with which all 
corporate compliance officers are intimately acquainted.  The elements encompass compliance 
standards and procedure; oversight by high level personnel; due care in delegating authority; 
effective communication of the program within the company and steps taken to achieve 
compliance. Included here is a “reporting system” employees might use without fear of 
retaliation, to encourage whistleblowing.  There are other elements, but the key is to have the 
organizational efforts so focused on prevention and detection as to constitute “due diligence.”14 
Of course, the government cannot force any private employee into having such a program as 
described before the fact. But after the fact, in addition to the severe, unmitigated penalties that 
could be levied against the firm, a program can then be forced upon it.  This brings us to the 
supreme organizational punishment, not listed in Figure 1.  It is called “Probation.”  
Organizations, in practice, go to very great lengths to avoid it, even agreeing to pay high dollar 
fines.  An organization placed on probationary status for serious infractions will be forced to put 
“an effective program” in place; could be assigned an overseer appointed by the government to 
remain on site for a specified period of time to watch over the new program and even more 
general corporate activity; will have to make books and records available to the government on 
demand; and will be held to making all penalty payments in full and on time. 
The Guidelines apply to all infractions of federal law subsequent to November 1, 1991.  They 
are, to our knowledge, the only such body of law in the world focused on corporate behavior and 
calculated to motivate the maintenance of a corporate culture that actively promotes lawful and 
ethical behavior.  The word “ethics” does not appear specifically in Chapter 8.  However, on the 
ground, in actual practice, government regulators are very much affected by the presence, or the 
absence, of a corporate code of ethics which actually provides support for the corporate 
compliance program.15  The reason for this practical ethics requirement has been stated succinctly 
by the author of the most important legal treatise extant on compliance programs and the 
organizational sentencing guidelines: 
The dynamic nature of business crime also suggests that no compliance program can truly be 
effective if it neglects the broader subject of ethics.  With laws (or the interpretation of laws) 
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subject to change on little notice, ethical reasoning and instincts can act as an all-important 
safety net.  A purely legalistic approach, by contrast, may ill serve not only ethics, but 
compliance itself.  A limited approach may also be unsatisfying to many employees as well as 
to others in a company’s community-such as customers.16  
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, however, do not substitute the corporate offender 
for the individual offender.  The complete Federal Sentencing Guidelines  punish both, severely.  
In fact, corporate punishments can be mitigated when, in a timely fashion, the corporation 
cooperates with the government by self-reporting its offenses and discloses to the government all 
pertinent information sufficient for law enforcement personnel to identify the individuals 
responsible for the criminal conduct.  In other words, employees who continue to believe that 
they are acting properly as long as what they do satisfies the prevailing corporate behavior 
standard (“meet that bottom line if you want to succeed, no matter what”) are in for a rude 
awakening and serious personal punishment when that same corporation suddenly hangs them 
out to dry.  Jail time is very often their fate. 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines pose enormous risks for business and for individuals 
when the rules are broken and make very clear as well, that ethical behavior beyond specific legal 
requirements plays an important role in how, when, and to what extent the sanctions attached to 
those rules are applied.  The Soros dichotomy would hardly hold up here, either for the firm or 
for the individual.  
In 1999, in addition to bargained and settled organizational cases under the Guidelines, 255 
organizations were sentenced under Chapter 8, a 15.9% increase from 1998.  Fines were imposed 
on 200 organizations.  The sentenced organizations pled guilty in 91.4% of the cases; 8.2% were 
convicted after trial.  One defendant pleaded nolo contendere.  As in 1998, fraud was the most 
frequent offense committed by an organization.  The highest fine in 1999 was $500,000,000.17 
Some 56,000 individual defendants were reported to the Commission under the Guidelines in 
1999, up from some 51,000 in 1998.  The second most frequently applied of the guidelines, 
behind drug trafficking, was that pertaining to the crime of fraud.18 
It only remains to be pointed out that neither the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, nor any 
other legislative responses to societal concerns about unethical market behavior are “civil law” 
responses.  They are the legal result of a common law process whose basic purpose is to eschew 
the civil law function of reducing all behavior to inviolate rules.19 
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While many securities firms have run afoul of the Sentencing Guidelines in such areas as 
insider trading and other forms of fraud, such as the Salomon Brothers traders’ attempt to corner 
the Treasury Bond Market, we complete this section of the paper with some examples of 
seemingly within-the-rules behavior of securities firms specifically, which raise ethical issues 
and legal issues as well.  We also note how in some cases these practices are triggering the 
common law process discussed above. 
 
IPO “Spinning” and Special Commissions 
In the world of Wall Street “spin desks” (as of 1997): 
Many investment banks silently allocate chunks of hot new stocks to the personal brokerage 
accounts they hold for corporate executives and venture capitalists – “spinning” or “flipping” the 
shares on the day of the IPO for quick profits – in an apparent bid for business from the executive 
firms…’At its extreme an IPO is priced Wednesday.  Thursday morning you call 25 venture 
capitalists and say:  “by the way, XYZ just went public at 15.  It’s now 30.  You just sold your 
allocation at 29 ½.  I hope you’re happy.’20 
Should this kind of spinning be looked at as a quid pro quo?  If so, the executive who takes 
the profit has to deal with the issue of breach of fiduciary duty.  Fiduciary duty posits a very 
special relationship between principal and agent.  One aspect is that the fiduciary has an 
affirmative duty not to profit by virtue of his position as a fiduciary; another is an affirmative 
duty to disclose to the principal any and all information in his possession that bears upon any 
decision the principal is to make.  Both duties are inconsistent with taking spin money as, say, a 
chief financial officer of X Company, or helping to decide on using the spin profits’ investment 
bank to underwrite X Company’s new stock issue. 
Many firms who spun and then “flipped” IPO stock for major firms’ officers (turned it over 
quickly for a profit) had been preventing lesser customers of the firm, who manage to get a small 
piece of an IPO, from “flipping” the very same stock.  The method used was to inform all of the 
firm’s brokers that if their regular customers do not retain their stock for 20 or 30 or however 
many days, then the broker loses his commission on the original sale. 
The “spin” broker’s refrain is of course, “everybody does it and they always have.” 
Inevitably, one of society’s message bearers, in this case in the form of the Wall Street Journal, 
exposes the practice to the light of day for all those in and out of the game to see, and with easily 
perceivable distaste.  The “justice, reason and common sense” of the common law process is set 
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in motion, and  the SEC is now investigating the process. State securities regulators have also 
come down heavily on spinning as a “dishonest and unethical business practice” that puts the 
firm’s brokers in direct contravention with the financial interests of their customers.  
Massachusetts regulators have charged brokerage firms with wrongdoing here and stated that 
“requiring firms to abandon (these) policies is one of the more severe sanctions we will 
impose.”21  It would be overstating the case to say that spinning is now extinct.  However, if not 
abandoned, spinning is down by a considerable degree.  And those who insist on playing that 
game are now opened up to lawsuits, in which the “rules” will be no defense. 
Finally, in connection with IPOs, there is the issue of just how broker-dealers make 
allocations of these (at least, formerly) “hot” stock issues.  The “rules” would seem to have been 
clear:  how broker-dealers allocate IPOs, or any stock issues, is strictly their business.  But it is 
now alleged that in order to obtain shares of hot IPOs, some investors paid hefty stock trading 
commissions, well above the going rate, to particular broker dealers.  According to the SEC, this 
might be interpreted as commercial bribery -–a whole new slant on the good old “rules,” and a 
clear response to strong ethical concerns.  If, in fact, the mass of consumers were frozen out of 
hot issues because hefty commission agreements were key to obtaining the money-tree IPO 
issues, social concern is clearly warranted.  Whether or not the SEC can prove direct connection 
between fee and allocation is not necessarily the issue:  tons of documents have been 
subpoenaed, United States and New York City prosecutors are investigating and the securities 
industry has suffered another blow to its already damaged image.22  Clearly, there is a sizeable 
group of Wall Street defendants, former employees and sensitized working managers who have, 
quite recently, observed at close hand this example of the common law process at work.  There 
are two other examples: 
 
“Soft Dollar” Services 
Investment managers often get an array of services from many brokerage firms to whom they 
give their business.  It has even been estimated that the soft dollar brokerage business accounts 
for as much as 40% of all stock trading.23  Soft dollars are certainly not all unethical.  Some of the 
higher commissions (soft dollars) paid to brokers result in an investment manager being provided 
with valuable extras, including independent research such as stock reports and data feeds, which 
do not come automatically with purchase and sale execution.  That is not a kickback from the 
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broker; rather, it is a return for the higher commission paid.  However, investment managers 
rarely inform their clients that they are actually paying higher than normal broker fees, nor, 
certainly, what they are getting in return.  This becomes a problem when the broker returns part 
of the excess fee in the form of payment for new top-of-the-line furniture for the manager’s 
office. 
The result of public exposure to the soft dollar phenomenon was an 18 month sweep of 250 
investment advisors and 7 broker-dealers by the SECs Office of Compliance.  The concern of 
Chairman Levitt went beyond excessive commission rates to such areas as the overtrading of 
accounts, and inferior execution by less efficient brokers to satisfy a soft dollar obligation.  These 
are unethical behaviors, failing the test of fundamental fairness to one’s customers.  Subsequent 
to the compliance report, the SEC moved to tighten up section 28(e) of the securities laws, which 
does not prohibit soft dollars per se.  Full disclosure to clients is the watchword now and, in the 
case of the $5.5 trillion dollar mutual fund business, better disclosure to investment advisors’ 
boards.   
 
Securities “Clearing Firms” and Responsibility For Activities of Their Customers 
Clearing firms are trade processors.  They are large brokerage houses which are hired by 
smaller firms, called introducing brokers, to execute trades for them, maintain client records, 
send out trade confirmations and monthly statements and also settle the smaller firm’s 
transactions. By this clearing firm arrangement, the introducing broker is able to use the cachet of 
the powerful, well-known firm, and the powerhouse firm is able to make a tremendous amount of 
money.  The clearing firm requires introducing firms to put up a deposit, usually some $250,000.  
It also levies a “ticket charge” of $10 to $25 on each trade it conducts for the introducing broker.  
It also charges interest, usually 1% per month, on margin loans it makes to these customers.24 
Since 1982, when commissions were deregulated, clearing firms have not had legally 
determined oversight responsibilities for their introducing brokers.  The operating principle has 
been to provide the service and earn the money for any introducing broker who hasn’t yet been 
thrown out of the business.  The ethical character of the still-in-operation introducing firm was 
not regarded as the business of the clearing firm in any way; that is, no rule existed stating that it 
was. 
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Then A.R. Baron & Co., an introducing broker to its clearing broker, Bear Stearns & Co., 
went bankrupt.  Baron was also charged by the Manhattan (New York City) District Attorney 
with being a criminal enterprise that defrauded investors out of 75 million dollars.  Bear Stearns, 
whose clearing operations represented more than 25% of its multi-billion dollar business in 
recent years,25 came under fire in connection with the A.R. Baron debacle.   Bear Stearns cleared 
for Baron in 1995, when Baron’s credit was so bad it was unable to qualify for a corporate 
gasoline credit card.  In that same year, Baron paid $1.5 million in fines in an NASD settlement 
where it was alleged that it executed trades for customers at unfair and unreasonable prices.  By 
the end of that same year, Baron’s capital fell below the regulatory minimum.  Additionally, a 
Baron customer notified Bear Stearns of unauthorized trading in its accounts.  Bear Stearns 
simply referred the matter back to Baron.  In October of 1995, Bear Stearns injected $1.1 million 
of its own money into A.R. Baron to keep it afloat when its capital once more fell below the 
statutory minimum.  The SEC ordered Baron to halt all operations in May, 1996.  It filed for 
bankruptcy two months later, and less than a year after that came under formal investigation by 
the Manhattan District Attorney.26  
By early June of 1997, the NYSE and NASD had their officials meet with several clearing 
firm officials.  One firm, Oppenheimer & Co., announced plans to stop processing trades for any 
introducing broker client accused by regulators of charging excess commissions.27  Bear Stearns’ 
position was that a clearing broker had neither access to, nor control over, any introducing 
broker, and if subjected to customer claims, might well get out of the business altogether.28  The 
SEC then let Bear Stearns know it was preparing to consider making civil securities fraud 
charges against it, with attendant Sentencing Guidelines penalties if the U.S. Attorney went 
further with criminal charges.  A settlement was reached, with Bear Stearns agreeing to pay a 
fine, and restitution to A.R. Baron customers of $25 million.  The agreement apparently was that 
Bear Stearns “contributed to” A.R. Baron’s activities—something short of “aiding and abetting” 
fraud.  Bear Stearns' senior executive in charge of its billion dollar a year clearing business, 
Richard Harriton, later resigned.29  
The key question here is not why Wall Street firms would accept no responsibility for 
introducing brokers actions for a long time; rather it is how could a major investment bank fail to 
see changes blowing in the wind?  Hubris may well be part of the answer.  But an argument 
could be made that Bear Stearns’ admittedly strong compliance culture (nobody here is allowed 
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to actually break the law), did not focus on ethical sensitivity at all.  The notion that all action 
still legal is per se ethical and beyond punishment, is not true in fact.  What is true in fact is that 
the Common Law/Rule of Law system assigns basic duties of care to those who are paid to 
provide skilled services to others for a fee.  And the definition and application of these duties are 
susceptible to change – “to new conditions, interests, relations and usages as the progress of 
society may require.”30  As between the consumer and Bear Stearns, the duty to take due care to 
be informed about the behavior of the introducing broker, and to act responsibly (that is, 
ethically) to avoid harm, ought to be upon Bear Stearns, and any other clearing broker. 
 
II. The Common Law/Rule of Law System, Securities Markets Behavior, and the Technology 
Explosion 
Online trading is a coverall term for securities transactions entered into and completed on the 
Internet using computer processes.  The advent of online trading has already changed the 
structure of the securities industry.  According to recent data, more than 6.3 million U.S. 
households had online trading accounts as of April, 1999.31  Online transactions in 1998 rose 
from less than 11% of total stock trades in the first quarter to 13% in the fourth quarter.  Given 
that 400 billion shares of stock were traded on U.S. exchanges in 1998 (and far more since then), 
that percentage constitutes a lot of cyberspace transactions.  And according to The Wall Street 
Journal (1999) the top 10 trading firms control over 91% of the total business.32 
The advent of online trading has also changed the nature of the broker-client relationship. 
Prior to 1997, technological inefficiencies in the market had provided only fast acting 
professionals in possession of equipment and access to data with the opportunity for rapid daily 
profits.  Then came the NASDAQ bid-ask (point) spread collusion scandal, which had two 
important results.  First, the many brokerage firms allegedly involved in maintaining wider point 
spreads in order to heighten profits paid out more than $1 billion in settlements.  More important, 
new NASDAQ Trading Rules were put into effect, providing greater data access to non-
professionals through more prominent display of their stock orders on the NASDAQ system.  
Day trading could now become a game for everyone. 
Many customers trade on the Internet much as they would on the ground:  with a broker’s 
advice, or data provided by his or her firm, with an eye toward risk tolerance, present financial 
position, ultimate investment goals, and some substantive information on the companies in which 
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they invest. But there are also “day traders,” whose goal is immediate profit.  They often know 
nothing at all about the company whose shares they buy and sell, other than the direction in 
which they and their industry as a whole perhaps have been moving.  And trading as they do 
several times in a day, they may well lose sight of their current financial position. 
The question now, put simply, is the following:  given the changing nature of broker-client 
relationships in cyberspace, what are, and what ought to be, the rules in this awesome new game?  
Beyond that lies an even more difficult question:  what new shape might this game assume – 
perhaps shapes would be more realistic – and what are we to do about rules then? 
It might be argued that we are in a brave new world in securities trading now, where the true 
ethic is “assumption of the risk”: we are all fully responsible for our choices, win or lose, and 
broker-dealer duty does not go beyond performing all mechanical functions with some 
reasonable degree of care. 
An ethic calling for the consumer’s full and complete assumption of the risk is no ethic at all.  
It is nothing more than an excuse for intransigence by those who would argue for a right to be 
paid highly for their expertise, in the face of a disappearing correspondent duty.  And to negate 
meaningful duty to investors in the presence of technological leaps would be to argue that 
constitutional values are now outmoded—perhaps, even, that now is the time for a new, 
electronic constitution. 
This is a less than convincing argument to us.  While we have no ability to predict the future 
of securities markets in cyberspace, we are able to extend to cyberspace the issues already giving 
rise to questions of law and regulation.  Our position is that the Rule of Law will prevail, even on 
the Internet.  If it does not, competitive markets as we know them now will cease to exist, and 
meaningful discussions on the issue of securities will be limited to self-defense and survival.  
This is not to say that our basic constitutional values will not take new workable, practical legal 
and regulatory shapes that cannot now be foreseen.  But if private property rights and the sanctity 
of contracts are to prevail, so must fundamental fairness to the free citizens of a democracy.  
Outside of cyberspace, where almost all of us still live and conduct our business, there are 
legal and ethical constructs for promoting proper behavior in broker-client relations.  All 
stockbrokers, mainly because of the asymmetry of information that exists between the buyer and 
seller of securities, have some form of legal duty to every single client.  The extent of that legal 
duty depends on two central factors:  the nature of the service relationship between the parties 
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with regard to the transaction being done, and the extent of the information asymmetry between 
them. 
A broker receiving a simple buy order from a sophisticated client has a duty to that client.  
But it is limited to the quality of execution only: proper timing and price.  How that stock 
performs is the client’s risk, not the broker’s.  At the other end of the scale is the elderly widow, 
completely lacking in market experience, who comes to a broker for advice on how to invest her 
nest egg which is now $250,000 in bank CDs.  Even here the broker’s duty may not be at the 
level of fiduciary; however, the broker had better get a lot of information on this widow’s 
preferences, risk profile, total assets and the like before making his investment recommendations.  
The duty of care here is far higher than to our first client.  And if the broker is handling a 
“discretionary” account in which she has full authority to buy and sell for the client’s portfolio 
according to the broker’s best judgement only, with no need for permission to make specific 
trades, then the broker’s duty is fiduciary, and that is a very high duty indeed. 
Given the varying duties of care on the ground then, how ought the law and the regulators 
deal with these duties in cyberspace; that is, online?  An investor choosing to invest online with 
the advice and assistance of a broker is entitled to broker duties of care equal to any on-the-
ground transaction.  For example, the New York Stock Exchange requires that brokers know 
their clients’ overall goals, risk preferences and time horizon before they execute an order, 
whether they recommend the particular transaction or they do not.  This is referred to as the 
“suitability” rule.  The NASD holds brokers firmly to a suitability rule when the seller has 
recommended the transaction, and is considering enlarging the duty to all transactions in 
cyberspace.  To what level of legal duty, exactly, should an online broker, lacking the normal on 
the ground client relationship, be held?  How about on-the-ground brokers operating in 
cyberspace as well?  Is their level of duty different?   
A sizable percentage of arbitration cases in which customer-buyers prevail are based 
presently on “unsuitable” investment grounds.  In the face of any meaningful market retreat, the 
ethical and legal issues of “knowing” and “suitability” could bring about an intolerable load of 
damage claims. 
It is difficult to contemplate a brokerage firm of any kind of making money for themselves in 
the absence of any duty to act in their clients’ best interests and in an informed fashion.  
Certainly, what is reasonable in cyberspace may require different suitability rules depending upon 
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the nature of the relationship; however, whether it be mandatory pre-trading customer 
information filing, trade blocking for particular customers of specified risky investments, or 
something else, some duty of suitability must be implied, even in cyberspace, in a form dictated 
by two things:  first, the presence of transparency, honesty, and non-misleading behavior—the 
hallmarks of the fairness and trustworthiness value; and second, reasonable accommodation to 
the new structure and function of existing technology.  As long as we continue to live under a 
Constitutional value system upheld by the Rule of Law through the Common Law adaptability 
process, we will find ways to efficiently utilize technology in an out of cyberspace, without 
negating meaningful duties of care owed to the public by market managers and those they 
supervise.  If technology is allowed to pull beyond the Rule of Law, we might survive that event 
as well—but not as residents of a constitution-based, democratic republic.  
There are many issues to be faced in the new world of technology driven securities markets in 
addition to that of the broker-dealer duties of care to investors.  Much of this burden will fall, as 
it has in the past, on the regulators.  Regulators seeking to ensure the continued development of 
the wealth creating function on the one hand, and the fairness and integrity and safety of the 
markets on the other, are faced with a formidable task in a cyberspace with, as yet, indefinable 
dimensions. In the face of technology developing exponentially, how does one keep one’s legal 
and ethical bearings?  The editor of a Wall Street magazine put the problem for regulators 
somewhat in perspective: 
Regulators are having as tough a time as everybody else trying to figure out what their new 
priorities should be.  We all need to move more carefully-There’s too much at stake from the 
livelihood of market makers to the health of the nation’s economy.33 
We argue that there are three general, but crucial considerations that relate to the coming 
regulatory task in the securities market area.  First, technology driven market change has outrun 
our capacity to comprehend fully the meaning of what has already happened in our securities 
markets, much less what ought to be happening in the future.  Second, we face great difficulties 
in doing cost benefit analysis regarding individual regulations in the presence of conflicts 
between efficient markets and democratic values.  Finally, we must continue to deal with the 
reality of both politician and regulator conflict of interest, and self-regulating organization 
conflicts as well. 
To begin at the beginning: while our regulators do not truly understand the present or future 
state of securities markets, they must act as if they really did.  Questions of fairness, efficiency 
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and safety must be faced since, every day, trillions of dollars, marks, pounds, euros, francs, yen 
and such continue to change hands in various ways all around the world with some effect, surely, 
on “the public interest.”  And in addition, tremendous numbers of players feel justified in arguing 
that public interest is irrelevant to them on the ground that they are playing by the existing rules.  
Any argument that we should forgo all regulation, let the market sort everything out for itself 
until equilibrium is reached, and in the meantime, “c’est la guerre,” is nothing short of 
preposterous. 
How, then, to proceed realistically in the whirlwind?  We suggest utilizing a sensible general 
approach to working in the face of uncertainty:34  regulators ought first to examine where current 
securities markets changes appear to be taking us.  They are pointed in the direction of rapid 
institutional and product development, and diffused delivery systems, surely.  These changes 
create unique opportunities for creating wealth—and for increasing worldwide competition, and 
risk as well. 
As an example of such a change, we focus on one final development:  the stock exchanges 
themselves are in the process of changing their forms and possibly their responsibilities.  We 
have reached the stage where a four year old computerized stock trading service (an ECN or 
“electronic communications network”) has applied to the SEC to become a brand new stock 
exchange,35 and many other ECNs are waiting in the wings to apply as well.  The SEC is studying 
the issue, and could well grant such an application.  In 1999, the SEC rule referred to as “Reg 
ATS” took effect, which allows alternative trading systems to become stock exchanges.  That 
regulation is focused on the probability that ECNs would be good for market efficiency by dint of 
rapid innovation and lowered transaction costs. 
How should these cyberspace stock exchanges be regulated?  And by whom?  Should they 
largely regulate themselves as self-regulating organizations?  To what duties must they hold 
themselves?  SEC market regulators know the truth of one market exchange expert’s recent 
remark: 
This is not a revolution. 
It’s an earthquake36 
It must be pointed out that the three major exchanges (NASDAQ and the American Stock 
Exchange being combined, however) are not unaware of the challenges they are facing.  Since 
ECN financial ownership, currently, comes from sources dependent on NYSE listing and 
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liquidity, that exchange is less immediately threatened than NASDAQ-ASE.  Nevertheless, the 
NYSE is seriously contemplating becoming a for-profit company selling its own shares to the 
public.  The focus is on removing the existing, entrenched power structure that holds back 
change, and creating a sizeable pool of funds with which to buy, most likely, ECNs themselves.  
The NASD is also contemplating spinning NASDAQ off as a private for-profit company and 
selling shares to the public as well.37  
Fragmented securities markets, such as are suggested by the ECNs, must surely point 
regulators in the direction of conflicts of interest.  Best execution and best price, for example, 
from a brokerage-owned ECN, may not be forthcoming. One might also ask whether a publicly 
owned NYSE, with self-regulating powers, could be truly dependable and fair to all customers in 
the face of the Wall Street imperative to make as much money for its owners, right now, as 
possible without breaking current law.38  These conflicts emphasize the need to consider “which 
entities should be allowed to own which others” equally with “how best to police conflicts of 
interests in an unfettered ownership market.”  One might answer that there’s no need to worry 
about exchange operators since self-regulating organizations and the market itself will take care 
of all serious funny business.  That answer represents, at best, the triumph of hope over 
experience.  
Self-regulating organizations have, of late, shown disturbing weaknesses.  In addition to the 
NASD lapse, 1999 saw the securities industry’s number one SRO-the New York Stock Exchange 
– publicly chastised for oversight failures.  What the NYSE missed was the existence of illegal 
trading on the floor of the exchange.  Floor brokers executing orders in an account were allegedly 
sharing profits from that account as well.  Four NYSE floor brokers also pleaded guilty in a 
federal court to a conspiracy to place trades to benefit themselves and not their customers.  The 
result of an SEC investigation was the institution, by the NYSE, of several new regulatory 
initiatives, including a system that will enable the exchange to reconstruct any trade or cancelled 
trade from beginning to end.39 
It does not belittle the generally careful and laudable oversight of the NYSE and the NASD to 
note the possibility that when oversight problems do arise, they could be related to an overly 
protective watcher stance with a bit too much regard paid to the interests of the watched rather 
than their customers. 
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As previously mentioned, there are, of course, other issues to be faced relative to how law 
and regulators ought to respond to securities markets and expanding technology issues.  They are, 
for the most part, however, more complicated aspects of issues that are faced on the ground 
already: determining the costs and benefits of any regulatory action; dealing with regulator turf 
issues (how do we prevent overlap and internecine regulator warfare), especially after the repeal 
of Glass-Steagall, when banks, brokers and insurance folk will be combining, even in 
cyberspace; and finally, dealing far more forthrightly than we have to date with the issue of what 
internal regulator conflicts of interest interfere with proper regulatory functions.40  
Dealing with these three issues, even in the absence of cyberspace technology has not been – 
and still is not – easy.  Competing scientific, political, economic and public social concerns, such 
as those regarding environmental policy, must be considered and weighed constantly, and 
judicial and regulatory responses fashioned, albeit in a manner and at a pace that would certainly 
unsettle civil code adherents.  Our trump card has always been an established culture of public 
interest protection arising out of our Rule of Law and its Common Law adaptability process.  
And will continue to be, even in cyberspace, as long as our original constitutional contract is 
observed.41  
 
III. Conclusion 
We have attempted, in this paper, to show how our Common Law/Rule of Law system 
allows for effective legal and regulatory responses to social demand and, in essence, promotes 
adherence to the spirit, as well as to the letter, of the law.  And we have argued that this socio-
legal process demands ethical behavior often beyond the boundaries of rules, which, if lacking on 
the part of securities firms and their managers, could cause great harm to these managers, to their 
firms, and to the body politic. 
Maintaining this law and regulatory system in the face of rapid technological 
development will be ever more difficult, but ever more essential, if we are to protect and preserve 
the Constitutional value system upon which we all depend for safety, growth and fulfillment, 
whether as individuals or as business firms.  This is true in terms of financial markets certainly, 
but not in terms of financial markets alone.   
Recognizing and acting on the reality that our market behavior must be ethics-based as 
well as rules-based, and that our legal and regulatory system must continue to promote that 
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behavior, is imperative, surely, in the face of the scientific technology based genetic revolution as 
well.  Many competitive markets, commercial and investment banking, brokerage, insurance and 
health care markets particularly, are already becoming involved in genetics based commercial 
activity.  Here now, or coming relatively soon, are such areas as genetic testing for predisposition 
to genetic disease; gene therapy focused on present disease states (somatic therapy); gene 
“therapy” focused on “normal” states (germ cell therapy) encompassing everything from the 
choice of physical and perhaps mental characteristics of one’s offspring, to the act of cloning 
humans.  Much human progress is in the offing but much danger is there as well. 
Competitive markets, science, religion, and society itself will demand decisions requiring 
both human and governmental action beyond anything ever dreamed of as little as 50 years ago. 
How we as a Constitutional, Rule of Law society resolve the rules and ethical “ought tos” in 
terms of our behavior in securities markets, genetics markets, and others, could go very far 
toward determining not just the financial and economic, but the moral shape of humanity as well 
in the 21st Century and beyond.  It would be presumptuous of us to state unequivocally that the 
awesome promise of 21st century genomics could never be overshadowed by technological and 
market driven genetic engineering, much closer to dreadful gene tuning eugenics than to good 
health; or that a profusion of competing stock exchanges, or presently unforeseen institutional 
combinations, and trading methodologies of incredible volume and speed, could not bring about 
a weakening of duties of care and consumer protections as would have us functioning under an 
eventually intolerable burden of social and financial risk.  And this is to name but two of many 
possible, if not probable, technological, financial and natural science advances that could present 
our nation with the dazzling promise of human betterment – and the reality of wrenching, 
negative, socio-political, democracy-denying change.   
     Maximum Liberty and Justice, in the face of Minimum morality, is impossible.  And law 
alone cannot change that reality.   However, with what we believe is a realistic view of our 
nation’s past and present, we have great confidence that we will, in our future, extract far more of 
the good than of the bad from science, from technology and from our competitive market system.  
The story is told of Benjamin Franklin leaving Independence Hall in Philadelphia after the 
delegates’ work was completed, and being asked by an anxious matron, “Well, Sir, what sort of 
government do I have now?”  And Franklin replying : “A Republic, Madam, if you can keep it.” 
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     Well, we have kept it—with some moral lapses, to be sure.  We are a democratic republic, not 
a Utopia.  But there is, in our body politic, an imbedded values system arising out of the original 
constitutional contract.  We are not a minimum morality nation. 
     What we have tried to do in this article is to set out what we believe to be an essential 
ingredient in the preservation of that value system, particularly in the face of a total change 
dynamic greater than we have ever seen before, a dynamic which cannot help but challenge our 
democratic institutions.  That essential ingredient is our Rule of Law, upheld through our 
Common Law process.  It is an adaptable process that evaluates and acts upon the essential 
fairness of individual and institutional behavior—what it ought to be, as well as upon present, 
strictly rule-based conduct set out at some earlier time.  The Common Law/Rule of Law process 
exerts a powerful demand for integrity on the part of individuals and surely market institutions, 
for behavior that is trustworthy, fair and public confidence building. 
     We believe that examples we have given in Parts I and II of this paper model the effectiveness 
over time of this “essential ingredient.”  They should help to assure us that, if we all do our part 
to strengthen and preserve it, our Rule of Law will allow us to incorporate the benefits of 
progress while retaining our essential commitment to Liberty and Justice for all. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1With one important exception:  the abandonment of the original concession to slavery-a value 
well disposed of, and specifically replaced by the prohibition of slavery (13th Amendment, 1865), 
and the protection of basic constitutional rights in the face of any state attempt to abridge or deny 
them (14th Amendment, 1868). 
2 That situation has been the lot of many nations around the world who have had several 
incarnations of such pieces of paper, without ever effecting through them a value system capable 
of producing and sustaining a Rule of Law—to the great detriment of their financial systems, one 
might add. 
3 Gifis (1991), page 82, citing the judge in 37 N.W.2d 543, 547. 
4 For example, Congress has never defined “insider trading,” leaving it up to the SEC and the 
courts to define it within the broad, statutory limits. 
5 Soros (1998), pages 196-197. 
6 See Schlegal (1990), especially Chapter 1. 
7 See Bear and Maldonado-Bear (1994), pp. 406-407. 
8 Public Law 98-473, now codified in various sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. (1988). 
9 Mistretta v U.S., 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989). 
10 The Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Section 8, intro. Cmt. (1998).  “Organizations” is defined 
as including every possible combination:  corporations, partnerships, unions, trusts, pension 
funds, etc.  
11 Sentencing Guideline, note 17, supra at Section 8A 1.2, “Commentary” and section 3(K) 1-7 
(iii), “Application Notes.” 
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12 From The Merrill Lynch Principles, reprinted in Casey, (1997) pages 232-235.  See also Jackall 
(1988) for corporate culture’s clear effect upon the actions of individuals functioning within it. 
13 U.S. Dept. of Justice Memorandum (1999), as modified 3/9/2000. 
14 See Kaplan et al., Compliance Programs and the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines (Clark, 
Boardman, Callahan, 1994 at section 3.19). 
15 From the authors’ personal contacts with U.S. Government officials attached to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, the Office of the U. S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York and the Division of Procurement of the Navy Department. 
16 Kaplan et al., “Living With the organizational Guidelines,” Buchanan et al., Cases and 
Materials In Markets, Ethics and Law (Simon and Schuster, 1998).  See also Paine (1997),  pages 
91-97. 
17 United States Sentencing Commission (2000), 1999 Annual Report, Chapter Five, pages 45-47.  
More than one offense can exceed the $290,000,000 figure cited in the text. 
18 United States Sentencing Commission (2000),  pages 42, 44. 
19 See Kaplan et al at fn .15, supra. 
20 Siconolfi (1997c).   
21 All quotes are contained in Siconolfi (1998). 
22 See Pulliam, Smith, and Gasparino (2000).  
23 Taylor (1995). 
24 The figures are from a table in Morgenson (1999a).  
25 Smith (1999). 
26 The Bear Stearns story is fully and dramatically detailed in Morgenson (1999a). 
27 Siconolfi (1997b). 
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28 Siconolfi (1997a). 
29 See Gasperino (1999). Mr. Harriton has also issued a public defense of his actions based on 
two arguments:  first,  he was playing by the (then current) rules and there’s nothing wrong with 
that; and second,  the SEC also knew Baron was doing wrong and they did nothing, either, 
encouraging him to remain as Baron’s clearing firm. See “Fraud at Bear Stearns?  Two 
Views,”the Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1999 at page A26.  Harriton’s first argument is not 
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